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This article attempts to construct a theoretical framework for understanding the social
and legal meanings of privacy in a modem Chinese society. The focus of this inquiry is the
legal mechanisms of privacy protection in Taiwan. Important legal phenomenon in a pe-
ripheral Chinese society in light of its recent social, economic, and cultural transformation
is a fruitful resource for creative speculation on broader issues of constructing legal meaning
of privacy for contemporary Chinese societies.
As the basis of analyzing the role that law has played in privacy protection in Taiwan,
this article will examine the complexities of broader cultural patterns in understanding the
significance of social behavior under study. The right to privacy has many different aspects
and has been analyzed and developed in many different ways. This article will analyze the
Western concept of privacy in light of the corresponding Chinese concept. Chinese thinkers
developed a distinction between the concepts of public and private. What is considered
private in a Western society, however, differs from what is private in a Chinese society.
Some Chinese scholars believe that the Chinese do not have the concept of privacy, as
defined in the West, and so do not understand it. Under the distinct influences of both
Chinese traditions and modern Western culture, Taiwan is an ideal target for examining
the development of the legal meaning of privacy in a modem Chinese society. It is mean-
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ingful to study how the Chinese conception of privacy is developing to meet the changing
social conditions in Taiwan.
The first part of this article analyzes the dichotomy between private and public in a
traditional Chinese society. The second part is a statutory review and empirical assessment
of whether the legal protection of privacy has been effective in Taiwan. The third part
discusses a solution for better privacy protection in Taiwan. This article concludes that the
Western conception of privacy, to a great extent, has been incorporated into the Taiwanese
domestic legal systems.
In 1999, for the first time in Taiwanese civil law history, the term "privacy" appeared
within the Civil Code. The Civil Code recognized the citizen's right to privacy and the
right to definite remedies for privacy violations. Taiwanese people are increasingly resorting
to formal legal channels as a remedy for invasions of privacy. However, the law, migrating
from foreign states, is desperate for society to provide a concrete definition of privacy. The
final part of this article will argue that Taiwanese law should not continue to borrow from
foreign jurisprudence. Taiwanese law needs to develop its own criteria in balancing the
conflicting interests associated with privacy.
H. "Privacy" in Traditional Chinese Societies: Public,
Private, and "In-Between"
History provides a window to the Chinese attitude toward "privacy." Even before the
third century B.C.E., Chinese philosophers had developed a sharp distinction between the
concepts of public and private.' Confucius distinguished state affairs from private business,
and public life from the private life. Traditionally, Confucian thought dominated other
schools.2 Confucian values, identified as the foundation of China's great cultural tradition,
controlled the social order and regulated the day to day lives of the people in all areas,
including their legal consciousness, expectations of justice, and the individual's perception
of privacy.
Confucius uses a revealing phrase about "privacy" when he says that "a timid man who
is pretending to be fierce is like a man who is so dishonest as to sneak into places where
one has no right to be by climbing through a gap."3 The saying, by interpretation, involved
the idea of physical constraints and the management of personal space. Another saying,
"the Gentleman is free and has nothing to hide," can also be explained as to discourage
anonymity in public and the pursuer of over-protection of personal information.4 The re-
marks about public and private affairs in the Analects show that Confucius was familiar
with the distinction between private and public.
However, for Confucius, "public" referred to the affairs of the government, while "pri-
vate" denoted family life, rather than individuals. It is therefore argued by some commen-
tators that there is no equivalent term for "privacy" in the Chinese language. Chinese
1. Han Fei Tzu, advocate of a strong state, never had positive regard for private behavior. See generally
BARRINGTON MOORE, PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 221 (1984).
2. Confucianism and Legalism have existed side by side, although not with equal influence throughout
Chinese history. Historically, these two philosophies have blended over the centuries with different emphases
during various periods of history. See RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW 15-16
(1995); MOORE, supra note 1, at 221.
3. Confucious, ANALECTS XVII 17-12 (James Legge trans., Dover Publishing ed. 1971).
4. Id. at VII, 7-37.
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scholar Souming Liang in 1987 stated "the Chinese have not had the concept of privacy in
the past, and so far do not understand,"5 and Yaoji Jin 6 in 1994 stated "the Chinese do not
have the concept of privacy as defined in the West."' However, a close examination of the
Analects reveals that Confucius does suggest a boundary between family and outsiders-a
boundary that maintains the family space free from interference, reserves a right of not
revealing family matters, and maintains a closely intimate relationship that is differentiated
from outsiders.' Therefore, the dichotomy between the private and public spheres should
be defined as the boundary between family members and the people in the outside world.
From the individual's perspective, since individuals are submerged into a family as one unit
of the society, family members have rather low expectations of personal privacy within the
household. Moreover, since the Confucian norm was a patriarchal family, privacy in the fam-
ily is in extremely hierarchical fashion.' The "father-son," "husband-wife" relationships in
Confucianism were asymmetric in nature. Confucian doctrine laid heavy obligations on the
wife and children. Under no circumstances should children disobey their parents. The result
is that, unlike the West, in which individual rights of privacy are subject to equality and rec-
iprocity, privacy rights in traditional China are subject to one's status within the family.
Overall, it was the family, not the individual that constituted the unit of the social and
political community. "0 Strict obligations were attached to kinship/family relationships. The
penal system, for example, included collective punishment in the form of "corruption of
blood" that could be extended to an offender's entire family. This type of collective pun-
ishment reflected the family-oriented system. The mutual obligations between the individ-
ual and the family certainly served as a social control agent.' Family/kinship emphasis
evidently constituted a complex social network of mutual obligations that sustained the
conventional morality of the day and compromised the individual's right to privacy.
Supporting evidence of the relationship between the family/kinship emphasis and privacy
protection can be found in traditional Chinese architecture. Most ancient Chinese houses
were built in the shape of the "three-side enclosed courtyards" ([1) or the "four-side enclosed
courtyards" (0l), which were formed by inward-facing houses on four sides and closed in by
enclosure walls. 2 Generally, the gentleman and lady of the house lived in the main building
facing the sun and their children lived in the side chambers. Opposite from the main building,
the south side nearest to the entrance gate was generally used as the study, the reception room,
the man servants' dwelling, etc. From the "public" perspective, such a residence offers some
private space within the family. However, from the individual's perspective, such a residence
forces everyone to live in a "transparent society" within the family.
The question remains whether the concept of privacy exists in traditional Chinese cul-
ture." Although the Analects did suggest a boundary between family and outsiders, there
5. LIANG SOUMING, THE ESSENCE OF CHINESE CULTURE (1987).
6. Yaoji Jin, Zhongguo Ren & Dui Sivinquan Delijje, Chinese Idea of Privacy Right, MING PAO MONTHLY
56-62, Feb. 1994; See generally SOUMING, supra note 5.
7. See Ying-Keung Chan, Privacy in the Family: Its Hierarchical and Asymmetric Nature, 31 J. Coup. FAm.
STUD. 117 (2000).
8. Chan, supra note 7, at 4.
9. Id.
10. It has been said that two Chinese make a family; three Chinese make a bureaucracy. Family unity and
governmental bureaucracy are, indeed, two important features of the history of Chinese civilization.
11. XiN REN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND THE LAW OF THE TRADITION 27 (1997).
12. Traditionally most urban Chinese lived in quadrangles called four-side enclosed courtyards (si-he-yuan).
13. See Chan, supra note 7, at 5.
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was no equivalent term for "privacy" in the Chinese language. Although it can be implied
from the Analects that some sort of solitude and intimacy should be reserved within the
family as against the outside world, it would be an oversimplification to conclude that
"privacy rights" existed in traditional Chinese society. At best, we can say that by empha-
sizing the family/kinship intimacy, some sort of ambiguous "privacy rights" can be found
in terms of maintaining family space free from outside interference, which significantly
differed from the definition and coverage of "privacy rights" in Western societies.
m!. "Privacy" in a Modern Chinese Society: Social Meaning
and Legal Reform in Taiwan
In the West, the meaning of privacy has been examined in depth by both sociological
and jurisprudential studies. Social scientists proposed four stages of privacy: the stage of
being alone; the establishment of intimate relations with others; the capability to remain
unrecognized in public; and the ability to protect personal information. 14 In the realm of
legal studies, more than one hundred years ago, Warren and Brandeis first articulated the
legal hypothesis that an individual has "a right to be free from public exposure of private
information about his or her life."'" To elaborate on the concept of privacy,' 6 Warren and
Brandeis stated that "the principle which protects personal writings and all other personal
productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any
form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality." 7
The concept set by Warren and Brandeis has been subsequently further developed by schol-
ars who described "privacy rights" as "a condition and right that is essentially tied to human
dignity, the principle of equal respect for persons, and the notion of personhood itself."' 8
Of course, Western society is not a privacy utopia. The United States, for example, is
still in endless debate on privacy construction (or destruction), especially on how to rebuild
the concept of privacy in the cyber era.19 With its historic commitment to privacy rights, a
patchwork of constitutional, statutory, and case law provides exhaustive informational pri-
vacy protections.2 0 Taiwan, under the distinct influences of both Chinese traditions and
14. I. ALTMAN, Privaiy: A Conceptual Analysis, ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR 8 (1): 7-29 (1976); see also ALAN
F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1970).
15. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
16. As for the common law privacy torts, "invasion of privacy" includes four separate privacy torts:
(1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) misappropriation; (3) publication of private facts; and (4) false light publicity.
The elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion are (1) an intrusion into an area in which the plaintiff has
a reasonable expectation of privacy and (2) that the intrusion is highly offensive to the reasonable person.
17. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. In the United States, the concept of "reasonable expectation of privacy" is the key factor of both con-
sticutional and the common law torts protections. Since the Supreme Court decided Katz, it is generally agreed
that an expectation of privacy is "reasonable" if it is "statistically justified." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). Drawn heavily from the "reasonable person" standard in torts, the statistical conception of the
Fourth Amendment contends that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy if a reasonable person,
placed in that individual's position, would expect that it remain private. The privacy test in Katz was reviewed
and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Kyllo. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). The Supreme
Court further defined the test by stating that the privacy test set in Katz should be (1) the citizen manifests a
personal expectation of privacy and (2) society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.
20. The First Amendment protects speech, including commercial speech, from interference by the govern-
ment and thus impacts informational privacy. The Fourth Amendment also provides limited protections against
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modern western culture, is an ideal target for the examination of privacy issues. It is re-
vealing to study how the Taiwanese Chinese are developing their conception of privacy to
meet the changing social conditions.
In the seventeenth century, a large group of Chinese began to cross the Taiwan Straits.2
Following unsuccessful efforts at resistance, the native people on Formosa were assimilated
by the Chinese immigrants. Chinese traditions and Confucian thinking were brought to
Taiwan by the immigrants. Since that time, Chinese traditions, including attitudes toward
law, have become rooted deeply on the island. During the Japanese occupation, a variety
of legal reforms were carried out by the Japanese.22 However, Japan, a country with a similar
cultural heritage to China's, did not significantly transform the society's traditional values.23
When the Nationalists (KNIT) fled to Taiwan in 1949 after the defeat by the Communists,
Confucian thinking was encouraged by the government.
24
In the last few decades, Taiwan began to transform socially when rapid economic devel-
opment took place. Economic development accelerates the pace of industrialization and
urbanization, which in turn reshape the traditional social and economic life. Although peo-
ple are profoundly affected by the traditional cultures that they have inherited, they are
also affected by modern technologies, popular culture," and the lifestyles of others.' 6 These
additional factors have been imported into Taiwan in recent decades. Taiwan, influenced
by business trends, has absorbed much from the West.
The jurisprudences and legal histories of Taiwan and China, although once the same,
have developed along different paths since 1949. The two jurisdictions have developed
distinct legal cultures and, in some cases, mutually unintelligible legal languages. The legal
system in Taiwan, a mixture of Chinese and Western society, is more formalized, institu-
invasions of privacy and its prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures offers a right to privacy from
governmental intrusion. On the other hand, the common law privacy torts protect individuals against certain
privacy invasions-including invasions by the government and by private citizens.
21. Portuguese navigators came upon the island of Taiwan in the seventeenth century. They were struck by
the beauty of its green mountains rising out of the waters of the Pacific and named the island "Formosa,"
meaning "beautiful island." Under the name Formosa, Taiwan was introduced to the Western world. The
Portuguese interest in Taiwan was only moderate and they soon left. The next Europeans to occupy Taiwan
were the Dutch. During the Dutch administration in the seventeenth century, large scale Chinese immigration
to Taiwan began. The mass Chinese migration to Taiwan changed the character of the island and was followed
by serious conflicts between Dutch and Chinese. The Ching dynasty of China made Taiwan its twenty-second
province.
22. Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. During its fifty-year
rule of Taiwan, Japan carried out several legal reforms on the island. Japanese forces surrendered the island of
Taiwan to the Allied Forces on October 25, 1945.
23. Taiwan was a relatively lawless place before Japanese occupation. During the fifty-year occupation, the
Japanese empire implemented several "laws" on the island. However, the fifty years of Japanese rule did not
substantially change Taiwan's legal culture due to the cultural similarity between the Taiwanese and Japanese.
24. Since the Nationalists fled to Taiwan in 1949 after the defeat by the Communists, they have claimed
R.O.C is the sole legitimate government of China. The Chiang Kai-shek administration declared it "succeeded"
the Chinese tradition and thus Confucianism was promoted.
25. Unlike China, Western popular culture has been "imported" into Taiwan almost without any political
barriers for decades. China, on the other hand, still maintains a serious censorship system.
26. FRANK B. GIBNEY, CREATING A PACIFIC COMMUNITY 20, 25 (1993). Mr. Gibney argues that "people are
profoundly influenced by the cultures, religions, and traditions that they have inherited-and this is true no-
where more than in East Asia." But, he says "people are also influenced by inventions, modern communications,
popular culture, and the lifestyles of others. All of these, thanks to modem technology, can now be exported
and imported at lightning speed."
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tionalized, and relatively transparent. The question remains, regarding privacy protection,
whether a direct transplant from Western jurisprudence is possible or even desirable in this
case.
27 From the perspective of globalization of law, can we insert a Taiwanese privacy
protection law and therefore transform the traditional social attitudes toward privacy in the
Taiwanese mind? In recent decades, the Taiwanese conception of privacy is no longer dom-
inated by Chinese tradition and culture, but has come under the influence of Western style
ideas. Is the evolving privacy concept in today's Taiwan still different from those in Western
societies?
A. THE FIRST VIsION: A NORMATIVE REVIEW
1. Constitution
Under the "Chapter on Rights and Obligations of the People," there are articles in the
Republic of China (R.O.C.) Constitution corresponding to the Bill of Rights in the U.S.
Constitution. s Although the term "privacy" is not incorporated into the R.O.C. Consti-
tution, and there is no article explicitly guaranteeing the right to privacy, the right to privacy
can be protected indirectly through jurisprudential inference and judicial interpretation.
First of all, article 12 of the Constitution which states "the people shall have freedom of
confidentiality of correspondence" and article 10, which states that "the people shall have
freedom of residence and of change of residence," provide a constitutional protection




Secondly, article 22 of the R.O.C. Constitution, like its American counterpart-the
Ninth Amendment, provides that "[aill other freedoms and rights of the people that are
not detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitu-
tion." 0 Article 23 of the R.O.C. Constitution states that the above freedoms and rights
shall not be restricted by law except as may be necessary "to prevent infringement upon
the freedoms of others, to avert an imminent danger, to maintain social order, or to promote
public welfare."' The R.O.C. Constitution makes it clear, through article 23, that the rights
and freedoms under "Chapter on Rights and Obligations of the People" are the safeguards
to prevent legislative arbitrariness, ensuring effective protection of people's freedoms and
rights. It remains for the Grand Justices to determine whether a certain law is inconsistent
with the Constitution)-3
The Council of Grand Justices expressed its opinion on "privacy" for the very first time
in Taiwanese judicial review history in 1992 in its "Interpretation of Council of Grand
Justices No. 293 on Disputes Concerning Debtors' Rights." In this interpretation, the
Grand Justices pointed out the "privacy" right of bank customers and the banks' obligation
to keep the credit record confidential. However, it is regrettable that the interpretation only
27. For criticism attributing the failure of attempts to transplant law into Africa, Asia, and Latin America in
the 1960s to a lack of awareness of extant cultures, see David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy
Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 4, 37 (1990).
28. See generally HERBERT HAN-PAO IMA, LAW AND TRADITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE SOCIETY (1999).
29. Article 10 of R.O.C. Constitution; Article 12 of R.O.C Constitution.
30. Article 22 of R.O.C. Constitution.
31. Article 23 of R.O.C. Constitution.
32. The R.O.C. Constitution must be interpreted when a doubt arises in applying the Constitution, when
a doubt arises as to whether a given law is in conflict with the Constitution, or when a doubt arises as to whether
a regulation is in conflict with the Constitution. Ma, supra note 28.
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vaguely suggested that the "privacy" right should be protected, without declaring or con-
firming that right to privacy is a "freedom and right" under article 22 of the R.O.C. Con-
stitution, and therefore, the restriction of the right to privacy is only allowed under con-
ditions set forth in article 23. In the dissenting opinions, three Grand Justices expressed
their regrets that the interpretation did not directly pronounce that the right to privacy is
a constitutional right prescribed in article 22 of the Constitution.
3
2. Administrative Laws
The Telecommunications Act,34 Communications Protection and Surveillance Act, and
the Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Act provide a model of how existing
Taiwanese laws cope, or fail to cope, with the need to balance government interests with
personal privacy. Under article 6 of the Telecommunications Act, communication processed
through telecommunications enterprises shall not be accessed or recorded without "au-
thorization." Nor shall the privacy be violated through other illegal means. Article 56.1
further provides that violators of paragraph 1 of article 6, regarding infringement on others'
secrecy of communication, shall be penalized with imprisonment of not more than five
years, with a possible fine of not more than NT$1,500,000.
However, the Telecommunications Act was structured in such a way as to allow the
interception of phone calls by law enforcement in some circumstances. The Communica-
tions Protection and Surveillance Act, which supplements the Telecommunications Act,
makes it easier to get the "authorization" indicated in the Telecommunications Act. Tele-
phone conversations, even if they originate from the home, are subject to far less significant
restrictions. Articles 5-7 of the Communications Surveillance Act allow law enforcement
to tap phones based on the suspicion that a person will talk about committing a specific
crime during that time. In theory, privacy is protected by the notion of "minimization," by
which law enforcement agents can be trusted to voluntarily ignore conversations that do
not pertain to the specific offense for which the warrant was issued. In practice, it is difficult
to say how, or whether, minimization is actually applied. Law enforcement in recent years
(particularly during the presidential campaign) has incessantly sought to expand its power
to tap into phone conversations. The development of technologies such as the cellular
phone and e-mail has seriously eroded the legal structure providing protections to private
communication. In 1997, there were more than 91,000 fixed-line phone numbers and more
than 31,000 cellular phone numbers35 recorded by law enforcement6
33. The dissenting Grand Justices were Rau-Tang Chen, Chang-Dau Chang, and Tai-zan Liu.
34. The Telecommunications Act, Article 6: Communications processed through telecommunications en-
terprises or dedicated telecommunications shall not be accessed or taped without authorization, nor shall the
privacy thereof be violated through other illegal means. A telecommunications enterprise shall implement
appropriate and necessary measures to safeguard the confidentiality of its processed communications. Article
56.1: Violators of paragraph I of article 6 regarding infringement on others' secrecy of communications shall
be penalized with imprisonment of not more than five years, with a possible fine of not more than
NT$1,500,000. The legal representative or service personnel of a telecommunication enterprise who takes
advantage of his business to commit the aforementioned crimes shall be penalized with imprisonment of six
months to five years, with a possible fine of not more than NT$2,000,000. The inchoate violators of the first
two paragraphs shall be penalized. The violator of the first paragraph shall be subject to prosecution instituted
only upon complaints.
35. This figure is fourteen times greater than the number of cellular phone numbers in Germany.
36. Conference on Telecommunications, held by National Tsing Hua University's Institute of Law for
Science & Technology and the R.O.C. Ministry of Communications.
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If legal mechanisms concerning wire-tapping and online tracking act as a massive sur-
veillance vacuum cleaner, databases are the garbage bag attached to it." The Computer-
Processed Personal Data Protection Law,is which governs the collection and use of per-
sonally identifiable information by government agencies and many areas of the private
sector,"5 was enacted in August 1995. The term "personal data" means the name, date of
birth, identification number, physical features, finger print, marriage status, family, edu-
cation, profession, health condition, medical history, financial condition, and social activities
of a natural person as well as other data sufficient to identify said person. The Act states
that collection and use of personal data shall be made in good faith and with consideration
of rights and interests of the concerned party and shall not exceed the scope of the specific
purpose.?
As for the Data Processing by Public Institutions (agency at central or local government
level performing official authorities by law), article 8 provides that "use of personal data by
a public institution shall be within the scope of necessity for its official functions as provided
in law and in conformity to the specific purposes of collection.' However, article 8 further
provides that use beyond the specific purpose may be made under any one of the following
37. As discussed in section III of this article, a recent attempt by the government to build up a new national
ID card called the "National Integrated Circuit (IC) Card" (hereinafter The Smart Card) generated public
outcry.
38. As promulgated on August 11, 1995.
39. Commercial compilation of personal information, chiefly for marketing purposes, has already reached
record levels and the size of private databases continues to expand exponentially.
40. The Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection Law, General Principles:
Article 1: This law is enacted to regulate the computerized processing of personal data so as to avoid
any infringement of the rights pertaining to an individual's personality and facilitate reasonable
use of personal data.
Article 6: Collection and use of personal data shall be made in good faith and with consideration of
tights and interests of the concerned party and shall not transgress the scope of necessity for a
specific purpose.
As for the data processing by public institutions (agency at central or local government level performing
official authorities by law):
Article 8: Use of personal data by a public institution shall be within the scope of necessity for its
official functions as provided in laws and in conformity to the specific purposes of collection.
However, use beyond the specific purpose may be made under any one of the following circum-
stances: (1) expressly provided by law; (2) with legitimate cause and for internal use only; (3) to
protect national security; (4) to enhance public interest; (5) to avoid emergent danger to the life,
body, freedom, or property of a concerned party; (6) necessary for preventing grave damages to
rights and interests of others; (7) necessary for academic research without harm to the major
interests of others; (8) favorable to rights and interests of a concerned party; (9) with written consent
of a concerned party.
As for the data processing of non-pubic Institutions (e.g., credit investigation business, hospital, school,
telecommunications business, financial business, securities business, insurance business, and mass
media):
Article 18: Unless for a specific purpose and satisfying any of the following requirements, a non-
government organization should not collect or process by computer the personal data: (1) upon
written consent from the party concerned; (2) having a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship
with the party concerned and having no potential harm to be done to the party concerned; (3) such
personal data is already in public domain and having no harm to the major interest of the party
concerned; (4) for purpose of academic research and having no harm to the major interest of the
party concerned; (5) specifically provided by the relevant laws.
41. Article 8 of the R.O.C. Computer- Processed Personal Data Protection Law.
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circumstances: (I) expressly provided by law; (2) with legitimate cause and for internal use
only; (3) to protect national security; (4) to enhance public interest; (5) to avoid emergent
danger to the life, body, freedom, or property of a concerned party; (6) necessary for pre-
venting grave damages to rights and interests of others; (7) necessary for academic research
without harm to the major interests of others; and (8) favorable to rights and interests of a
concerned party with written consent of the concerned party.
42
The above subparagraph raised serious and justifiable concerns about unauthorized access
to personal information in Taiwan. The principle-like nature of article 8 left many questions
unanswered. The lawmakers left crucial terms, such as "legitimate cause" and "public in-
terest" undefined, resulting in broad discretion for authorities to interpret these terms as
they see fit. For example, an "authorized abuse" of medical privacy could occur when Public
Health Authority discloses information to the police or employers "with legitimate cause"
or "to enhance public interest." The existing Personal Data Protection Act in Taiwan is
therefore insufficient and flawed. The Act needs to be supplemented by further regulations
to set out the manner in which criteria can be drawn to distinguish between the common
good and personal privacy. Such an amendment is being researched now.
3. Criminal Code
Chapter 28 of the Criminal Code, entitled "Offences Against Privacy," establishes the
criminal consequences for privacy intrusion. Article 315 of the Taiwanese Criminal Code
states that "a person who without reason opens or conceals a sealed letter or other sealed
document or paintings belonging to another shall be punished with detention or a fine of
not more than 3000 yuan.
43
In response to the development of digital technology, two additional provisions were
amended to the Criminal Code in 1999-section 315-1 and section 315-2. Under the new
rules, a person who, without reason, uses devices or equipment to peek at, wiretap, or
eavesdrop on conversations, or to record, photograph, or videotape private activities and
speeches, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years, detention,
or a fine of not more than 30,000 yuan. A person, who, for his profit, facilitates others to
commit the foregoing offenses by furnishing the location, devices, or equipment, shall be
punished with imprisonment for not more than five years, detention, or a fine of not more
than 50,000 yuan. Section 315-2 further stipulates that the same rules should be applied if
a person with the knowledge of the illegal recording disseminates, broadcasts, or sells the
content.
Within the context of criminal law, discussion of the right to privacy generally arises only
under the protections guaranteed by the Constitution and centers upon the criminal pro-
cedure issues of search and seizure. Scholarly examinations, therefore, have focused pri-
marily upon the protection of the privacy rights afforded to criminal defendants, rather
than upon the privacy rights of victims of criminal activity. Today, the "criminalization of
privacy invasion" is firmly established in the Taiwanese Criminal Code, with particular
attention on the use of digital technology. It is clear that criminal law now serves as a vehicle
for the substantive protection of individual privacy in Taiwan.
42. Id.
43. Article 315 of the R.O.C. Criminal Code.
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4. Civil Code
In 1999, the term "privacy" appeared for the first time in Taiwanese civil law history in
the text of the Civil Code. Prior to the 1999 civil code amendment, the Civil Code rec-
ognized, indirectly, the citizen's right to privacy, and the Taiwanese had to resort to legal
channels to vindicate harm to invasion of privacy via the interpretation and indirect appli-
cation of the provisions. Taiwanese privacy protection is rooted in the concept of "person-
ality right" which is the protection of dignity against abuse. According to article 18(I) of
the Civil Code, if any "right appertaining to one's personality" is illegally infringed, appli-
cation may be made to a court for the suppression of the infringement. Article 18(11) further
explains that under the above circumstances an action for damages or solatium may be
brought only in those cases specifically provided by law. The foregoing rules are supple-
mented by article 19 of the Civil Code that, if the "right" to the use of one's name is
unlawfully infringed, application may be made to the court for the suppression of the in-
fringement and for damages. Moreover, article 184(1) of the Civil Code goes on to stipulate
that a person who, intentionally or by his own fault, wrongfully injures the "rights" of
another is bound to compensate him for any damages arising there from. The same rule
applies when the injury is done intentionally in a manner contrary to the rules of good
morals.
It is generally agreed that, if statutory language is broad or vague, it creates limitless
power for the court to define and shape its own character through the vague standards.
The Civil Code is basically a comprehensive code, but is written in a loose, rather than
precise language on the standard of privacy protection. The terms "right appertaining to
one's personality" as stipulated in article 17 and "wrongfully injures the rights of another"
as stipulated in article 184 are left undefined.-
In practice, damages for emotional distress or mental anguish are often sought. However,
under the legal framework, as illustrated in the following table, invasion of privacy plaintiffs
could not seek recovery of typical torts damages if no other damages are proven. In other
words, prior to the 1999 amendment, unless specifically provided by law (e.g., article 19),
proof of special damages was necessary to recover damages for mental and emotional dis-
tress as a result of the defendant's invasion of privacy. Damages for mental and emotional
distress awarded in an invasion of privacy suit would be subject to the limitation on damages
for economic loss or injury.
As concerns about privacy increase, so does the protection the law provides. The 1999
civil code amendments made a sea of change in tort regulation and the term "privacy"
appeared for the first time in Taiwan in the text of the Civil Code. The amended article
195(1) stipulates that, in the case of injury to the body, health, reputation, liberty, credita-
bility, privacy, chastity, or other significant legal interests in personal dignity and integrity,
even if there is no pecuniary loss, the injured party may still claim a reasonable monetary
compensation for such damage. If one's reputation has been injured, the injured party may
also claim the taking of proper measures for the rehabilitation of his reputation.
Under the current legal framework, damages, such as emotional injury and injury to
reputation, can be presumed from the mere invasion of the right. Invasion of privacy plain-
tiffs may seek damages for emotional distress or mental anguish. If no other damages are
proven, nominal damages should still be awarded. Proof of special damages is not necessary
44. Article 184 of the R.O.C. Civil Code.
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Table 1
The Torts (Invasion of Privacy) in Taiwan prior to the
1999 Civil Code Amendments
Invasion of Privacy
Article 184(I)
"economic loss or injury"





If one's personality is unlawfully
infringed
to recover damages for mental and emotional distress that are a result of the defendant's
invasion of privacy. Non-economic loss or injury is awarded.
It should be noted that article 195(111) further stipulates that the foregoing rule shall be
applied to parents and children or spousal relationships only when "serious injury" is done.
Here, the traditional family/kinship emphasis, again, compromises the individual's right to
privacy. Family members have lower expectations of personal privacy within the household.
Although no longer a "transparent society" and some small private zones within the family
can be found today, "family" is still a concept poised in between the private and public
spheres.
B. THE SECOND VISION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
It is apparent that "legal protections of rights to privacy," although vague in the Consti-
tution and patchy in the relevant administrative regulations, have been developing in the
criminal and civil codes in Taiwan. After the review of the "law in the books," we turn to
the observation of the "law in action." In order to understand the social meaning of privacy,
it is helpful to examine the issue from the reverse angle: to inquire in what situations the
invasion of privacy is justified; in other words, to what extent the competing interests, such
as "governmental efficiency," "employers' property rights," and "the freedom of press," can
compromise an individual's rights to privacy. This section of the article will examine the
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privacy issues by four representative cases, the "Scoop Week" VCD case, the case concern-
ing illegal search of a university dormitory, the "Smart Card" debate, and the United Semi-
conductor e-mail surveillance dispute.
1. Privacy v. Freedom of Press: The "Scoop Week" Case
In early 2002, a widely circulated videotape featuring a female Taiwanese politician, Ms.
Chu Mei-Fang, stirred a debate on the island about where to draw a line between protection
of privacy and freedom of press. The original forty-seven minute video footage of Chu's
sexual intercourse with a married man was filmed by a hidden camera installed at her home
by Chu's friend, Kuo Yu-ling, and Chu's estranged boyfriend, the former Mayor of the
Hsinchu city-Tsai Jen-chien. 4 1 The videotapes were soon distributed to adult video stores
in Taiwan. The editors of Scoop Week, a weekly publication, obtained a copy from the
video store, scanned the video into photos, transcribed the conversation in bed,- and dis-
closed Chu's adultery scandal in its January 2002 issue.
4 Y
As mentioned, it is a criminal offence in Taiwan to violate others' privacy for profit. A
person who, without cause, uses devices or equipments to videotape private activities shall
be punished. The same rules should be applied if a person "with the knowledge of the illegal
recording" distributes, broadcasts, or sells the content.4 The final charges, made following
a two-month investigation, included violation of privacy, defamation, and violation of de-
cency. Prosecutors sought a twenty-six month sentence for Scoop Magazine founder Shen
Yeh and separate jail terms for his daughter who runs the Chinese-language weekly and
acts as her father's aide. In addition, prosecutors called for Tsai to be jailed for one year
and Kuo for four years. Scoop Week magazine, however, defended itself arguing that the
magazine is protected by "freedom of press" and that the people have "the right to know."
Although the government's actions have been supported by some academics who say Tai-
wan's unbridled tabloid press has ventured far beyond the limits of privacy in the search
for the sensational, the court is struggling in interpreting the statutory language of "with
the knowledge of the illegal recording," and must carefully draw the line between the
constitutional rights of free press and the criminal offense of illegal speech.
Offences against privacy cases in Taiwan challenge the courts to balance freedom of
speech rights and privacy interests. The development of the mass media in the last decade
and an explosion of sensational journalism in Taiwan have been significant issues in legal
scholarship and practice. The "snooping" of the mass media, which seeks to feed the ap-
petite of the scandal-mongering public, has been a phenomenon after the abolishment of
the long lasting Martial Law. As rebound (or revenge) against the constraint under the
Martial Law, mass media is overloaded with power in today's democracy. Given that "in-
45. Kuo Yu-ling and Tsai Jen-chien installed pin-hole cameras in Chu's apartment and bugged her phones.
Eavesdropping devices and surveillance cameras were found in Chu's car and office, too.
46. In addition, Scoop Week attached a copy of the VCD to the January 2002 issue. Since the news article
transcript and the video present different legal issues, e.g., spreading of obscenity, this paper focuses on the
transcript of the magazine, rather than the attachment.
47. The Government Information Office seized thousands of copies of the Scoop Week magazine and
accompanying VCDs, but pirated copies of the VCD have been widely circulated in Taiwan, China, and the
United States, making Chu one of the best known women in the Chinese speaking world. Taiwan police have
confiscated thousands of the videos but the videos have turned up for sale in Malaysia and in Brunei.
48. Chapter 28 of the R.O.C. Criminal Code.
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dividual privacy" is conceptually unclear and ambiguous in Chinese society, the freedom of
speech interests generally outweigh privacy interests when they are in direct conflict.
The public's appetite for shocking, thrilling, and voyeuristic news provides a lucrative
market for intrusively gathered information. In recent years, privacy is becoming increas-
ingly precarious for technological reasons. The use of new technology plays a significant
role in undermining privacy protection, leaving personal privacy rarely protected. However,
the law, by targeting the source of information for liability, may in most cases immunize
the publishers from being liable for disclosures of embarrassing information. If a magazine
newspaper "lawfully obtains" "truthful information" about a matter of "public significance"
for "public criticism," the media will rarely be held liable for publishing private information.
Freedom of press weighs more heavily than privacy interests.
In response to Scoop Week's defense that the information source was lawfully obtained
and a fact for public criticism, the court correctly ruled that Scoop Week should be crim-
inally liable for offences against privacy, but wrongfully stated that (1) Scoop Week was
"with the knowledge of the illegal recording" when purchasing the source video, because
an illegal recording can be inferred from the fact that Chu is a politician and not a profes-
sional actor, and (2) the way Scoop Week reported the news was gossip in nature, rather
than a comment on a fact subject to public criticism. What the court said is that, if "illegal
recording" cannot be easily inferred by the press/media, and the press/media has presented
the story in a more commentary approach, the privacy interest may compromise the free-
dom of press. Compared with the 1998 ruling in a California court on press privacy intru-
sion against American sex symbol Pamela Anderson Lee,49 the Taiwanese court's reasoning
weakened the legal protection of privacy, leaving personal privacy rarely protected in Tai-
wan, except in the extremely outrageous case, such as Scoop Week. Obviously, there is need
for a firm legal protection of privacy in Taiwan and clear criteria should be set to draw the
line between protection of privacy and freedom of press.
2. Privacy v. Prosecutor's Investigation: The "Cheng Kung University" Incident
This incident was triggered by an April 11, 2001 judicial search of the student dormitory
of the National Cheng Kung University. Prosecutors from the Taiwan District Prosecutor's
Office, acting on a tip-off, led police to search the dormitory. They found, by a room-to-
room search, fourteen personal computers on which MP3 music files were stored, s° and
confiscated the fourteen computers that allegedly contained illegally downloaded MP3 mu-
sic files."'
Not surprisingly, the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry Taiwan of-
fice (IFPI) immediately backed the prosecutors. However, the warrantless search angered
and shocked society, including not only the university students, but also about six million
Taiwanese internet users who may have downloaded music files on their personal computers
49. In 1998, Pamela Anderson Lee and her former lover Bret Michaels sued to enjoin an internet site from
broadcasting an explicit videotape of Lee and Michaels having sexual intercourse. The tape became public after
Michaels presented it to a colleague, who sold it to a pornographer. The California court noted that "even sex
symbols have privacy at home." JEFFREY RosEN, THE UNWArTED GAZE, 52-53 (2000.)
50. Illegal downloading of pop music from the internet is an extremely serious issue in Taiwan. Surveys
have shown that over 50 percent of Taiwanese university students copy or download copyrighted material and
pass it on to others if they think such material is good, regardless of the intellectual property rights protection.
51. Although the copyright law permits personal use of copyrighted materials (under the fair use doctrine),
downloading from illegal Web sites or through public facilities is illegal.
WINTER 2003
1050 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
at home. The Minister of Justice admitted that the search of the university dormitory
"departed somewhat from the guidelines for such moves, but that search was legal."52 An
alliance of university students throughout the island strongly criticized the Ministry as "a
police headquarters for the sole use of interest groups."" Students challenged the consti-
tutionality and legitimacy of the search as it violates the privacy "at home," which is arguably
protected under articles 10 and 22 of the R.O.C. Constitution.
The reasonable expectation of privacy, with respect to the place searched or the item
seized, is protected by the R.O.C. Criminal Procedure Law. A person has a legitimate
expectation of privacy any time the place searched was in fact his home whether or not he
owned or had a right to possession of it or he was an overnight guest of the owner of the
place searched. Generally, the police must have a warrant to conduct such search unless the
search can be justified by one of several exceptions.54 The relevant exception here is the
"consent" exception." The police officers in this incident claimed that they got the consent
of the Dean of Student Affairs at National Cheng Kung University. This argument, how-
ever, is not well grounded. Indeed, third party consent is allowed under the law, which states
that "where two or more people have equal right to use or occupy a particular piece of
property, any one of them can consent to its warrantless search. Any evidence found may
be used against the other owners or occupants." 6 However, the Dean of Student Affairs,
by no means, should be considered as "co-occupant" of the dormitory room, and therefore,
was not in the position to consent to the warrantless search.5" The room-to-room illegal
search at the student dormitory is not less intrusive than a door-to-door warrantless search
in a residential community, as they both are the most private of domains. The threat to the
privacy of university students is acute. After the highly invasive search, it is time for Tai-
wanese to recognize and rebuild the private space for university students.
3. Privacy v. Property Rights: The "United Semiconductor E-mail Surveillance" Dispute
In late 2001, Taiwan's United Semiconductor Co. fired about ten employees and put
over 200 employees on the "observation list,"" s accusing them of not being diligent in their
proper duties. The story began with an e-mail sent by the CEO of the corporation, entitled
"A Letter to all the Employees," with explanations of the company's outstanding accom-
plishments and future goals. Some of the employees, after receiving the letter, forwarded
it to their friends who were not employees of United Semiconductor Co. The IT/MIS
department of the corporation traced out the "forwards" through its e-mail surveillance on
its IP servers. Based on the records of employees' online messages and activities, ten em-
ployees were terminated for transmitting what the company deemed "confidential."
52. Maubo Chang, Education M 4inister Issues Open Letter to Students Over MP3 Downloads, CENTRAL NEWS
AGENCY, Apr. 16, 2001.
53. "Interest group" here refers to the IFPI.
54. If there is no search warrant (or the search warrant is not valid), the search can be justified if it is "stop
and frisk," "hot pursuit and evanescent evidence," or consented to.
55. The consent must be voluntary and intelligent.
56. Article 146 of the R.O.C. Criminal Procedure Act.
57. It is argued that schools must be safe and respectable learning environments. Therefore, it is difficult to
apply the general rules to school searches and seizures. The argument, however, is not relevant here because
the incident did not occur in a high school and did not concern campus safety.
58. The 200 employees were kept in the company but placed under surveillance.
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In terms of how the tort of invasion of privacy should be applied to cases of e-mail
monitoring, the primary question that needs to be answered is whether the employee has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in employer-provided computers and e-mail services.
How to balance the personal dignity of employees with the proprietary interests of em-
ployers is the central issue. There have been a considerable number of scholarly examina-
tions of the privacy in the workplace in the United States."' Some court decisions in the
United States indicated that the employer has no right to violate an employee's tort law
right to privacy by reviewing the contents of the employee's online messages. Others ruled
that the employee has no reasonable expectation of privacy and that the interception and
reading of those online messages is not an invasion of his privacy. In Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,
the court rejected an intrusion into seclusion claim. 60 The district court ruled that an em-
ployee loses any expectation of privacy he may have had by using an e-mail system that the
entire company used. On the other hand, in California, a private sector employer is required




However, there is little debate about "privacy at work" in Taiwan. It is interesting to see
that as common as it is for employers to monitor the actions and communications of their
employees, there have been a considerable number of lawsuits in the United States on this
issue but none in Taiwan.6 Although the controversies over e-mail privacy in the workplace
in the United States have not surfaced yet in Taiwan, with the increase of e-mail and internet
access in the workplace, employers are faced with the challenging issue of balancing em-
ployee privacy interests with the employer's legitimate business interests in monitoring
e-mails in the workplace. Most institutes in Taiwan, both in the public and private sectors,
are not aware of the potential problems that come along with the widespread use of e-mail.
Most employees in Taiwan use their workplace e-mail systems for both personal and busi-
ness use. Even though workplace e-mail systems are generally company property, employees
expect that their personal communications on these systems will remain private. However,
according to the survey conducted in 2000, the employees, in many cases, are mistaken
since employers often do monitor employee e-mails. 61 It remains to be seen if the fired
employees of the United Semiconductor Co. will resort to formal legal channels to vindicate
harm to their potential invasion of privacy.
4. Privacy v. Administrative Efficiency: The Smart Card Debate-M
In 1997, the Taiwanese government proposed a new national identification card called
the National Integrated Circuit (IC) Card (Smart Card). The government was moving to
take advantage of the efficiencies of the emerging architectures of control. The plan called
59. In most of the cases, the critical issues to examine when determining employer tort liability for moni-
toring or intercepting employee e-mail messages are whether the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, was there a legitimate business justification for the intrusion sufficient to override that privacy
expectation.
60. E.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
61. Peter J. Isajiw, Workplace E-mail Privacy Concerns: Balancing the Personal Dignity of Employees with the
Proprietaoy lnterests of Employers, 20 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH.J. 73 (2001).
62. As of May 31, 2002.
63. Yu-Chi Wang, Law and Society Symposium, Privacy at Workplace, National Tsing Hua University
(2000), available at http://teens.nthu.edu.tw.iscenter/publish/showpaper.php?serial = 7.
64. Smart cards are plastic cards, around the size of a credit card, containing several tiny microchips.
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for a development of smart card technologies with over 100 functions and uses for the card,
including identification, health insurance, driver's license, taxation, and payments. 65 In
terms of identification and links with a person's past, these cards are complete records for
each individual.
From the perspective of administrative control, the resulting efficiencies are valuable.-
From the aspect of privacy protection, however, it is controversial. There were informal
hearings to evaluate privacy concerns after protests about the plan arose. People were wor-
ried that the Smart Cards would get too smart. The plan failed in the end due to the protests.
A combination of grassroots opposition and bureaucratic incompetence has slowed, but by
no means stopped, the expansion and cross-referencing of government databases.
Given that doubts remain about the security and trustworthiness of these systems, schol-
ars publicly opposed the Smart Card project and have successfully stopped it. The Smart
Card-based system, however, is now developed for health information only. The new plan
calls for the establishment of a national health identifier. The Health Smart Card is designed
to gather and record in greater detail and volume the medical records of an individual
including genetic information and lifestyle details. The reasoning is that the assigning of a
permanent identifier to track personal health history will help fight disease, improve hos-
pital care, and lower the cost of health insurance. Even assuming this argument to be true,
the process would allow the most intimate details of our health history to be subject to the
prying eyes of anyone with the legal or illegal ability to tap into the database.
The Health Smart Card, which is now a voluntary policy but is expected to become
mandatory, contains the complete medical history of all R.O.C. citizens. As indicated in the
preceding section, the vague nature of the Computer-Processed Personal Data Protection
Law has raised serious and justifiable concerns about unauthorized access to personal in-
formation in Taiwan. With the pending policy on the Health Smart Card, increasing con-
cern is raised by the fact that information technology has made the speedy transmission of
medical information to multiple parties much easier. Among the third parties that the medi-
cal information might be circulated to are insurance companies, employers, pharmacies,
health service providers, hospitals, public health agencies, administrators, social welfare
programs, and direct marketing companies. Earlier this year, a newspaper reported that one
engineer working for Health Insurance Bureau illegally sold confidential information to
sales representatives of marketing companies. 67 Indeed, how else would a company be more
efficient in compiling a mailing list of, say, diabetics? The fact that one's detailed personal
information of specific medical conditions could be publicized by unauthorized use is fright-
ening. It remains to be seen whether the power from non-governmental circles can again
successfully oppose the further developments of the Health Smart Card.
IV. Privacy and the Construction of Legal Meaning in Taiwan:
Building up the Balancing Criteria
The analysis of Taiwan's evolving legal framework for privacy protection concludes that
the Western conception of privacy, to a great extent, has been incorporated into the Tai-
65. These cards will also contain a digital signature, identifying the holder when used with a governmental
database.
66. The entire system, however, was estimated to cost NTD$10 billion.
67. The law enforcement authority is now investigating the case.
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wanese domestic value system. However, although privacy is no longer defined by family
units, interpersonal boundaries still clearly distinguish family members from outsiders.
Family privacy still differs from personal privacy. The 1999 civil code amendment preserves
the Chinese traditional culture and value while incorporating the Western legal norms into
its context.
However, merely incorporating the concept of privacy into legal codes cannot guarantee
adequate legal protection. Given its historical conditions, rights to privacy have been largely
ignored by Taiwanese legal studies." Without the foundation of legal tradition, the concept
of privacy has been developing in a loose pattern. The term privacy as written in the law
is usually ambiguous and left for judicial interpretation, which typically relies on the well-
established social conception and people's privacy awareness. For example, the legal mean-
ing of the normative component of article 195 of the Civil Code depends on its empirical
social meaning. Whether an expectation to privacy is reasonable and whether certain con-
duct is considered highly offensive, socially acceptable, or statistically justified,6' directly
correlates with the Taiwanese people's legal consciousness, attitudes, and beliefs toward
privacy. Law in the books, imported from foreign states, is desperate for society to complete
its definition. Of course, this does not mean Taiwan should borrow or migrate more from
foreign jurisprudences. The Taiwanese law needs to develop its own criteria balancing the
conflicting interests with privacy.
The law, by its nature, is a reactive force and always responds to breaches of society's
"moral code." The formulation of the legal meaning of privacy is even more difficult when
society becomes complex and the social "moral code" is confusing. As shown in the four
cases above, privacy in Taiwan is bundled with other interests. What complicates the for-
mulation process of privacy conception is that a number of other values compete with
privacy. Individual's rights to privacy may conflict with the collective rights of the public,
the freedom of press, others' proprietary rights, and governmental administrative efficiency.
In practice, most "invasion" is done in the name of efficiency, productivity, or public in-
terests. Of course, all over the world privacy is not an absolute right that always has su-
premacy over other rights. Hence, the key issue is how society values the need for an
individual's privacy. The law needs to evaluate the level of harm to the individual versus
the needs of the public and decide what factors and criteria to consider when balancing
those competing interests.
The Council of Grand Justices, the civil and criminal courts, and the legislature are of
fundamental significance in establishing the right to privacy. Since the statutory language
is broad or vague, it creates limitless power for the administration or the courts to define
and shape its own character through vague standards. Lawmakers left crucial terms such as
"legitimate cause" and "public interest" undefined and left many questions unanswered.
The construction of legal meaning in Taiwan, therefore, resembles more of a common law
than a civil law approach.
However, since social evolution requires faster legal change than the judiciary can pro-
vide, comprehensive privacy legislation should be the solution. A prompt legislative update
is in demand in Taiwan. A comprehensive legal mechanism will provide detailed criteria
68. Privacy is either confused with secrecy or with defamation.
69. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Enayption Create a "Reasonable Expectation of
privacy?" 33 CoNNs. L. REv 503 (2001).
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which can reflect the Taiwanese cultural and social values, and can meet the Taiwanese
people's circumstances and needs. In other words, in addition to declaring the privacy
conception in the R.O.C. Constitution, which would build up a solid foundation for privacy
protection, detailed regulations should be added to the Civil Code, Criminal Code, and
administrative laws to ensure that society's need for privacy is not neglected.
V. Conclusion
This article analyzes the government's attempt to improve privacy protections by pro-
viding an overview of the existing relevant laws. The article also examines the failure of
Taiwanese law to protect privacy adequately, by presenting the Scoop Week case, Cheng
Kung University incident, United Semiconductor e-mail surveillance dispute, and the
Smart Card debate. While the government has attempted to adapt the law to advancing
technology and changing social norms, the Taiwanese legal system has failed to create an
effective mechanism for protecting privacy in today's social environment.
Due to the lack of historic commitment to privacy rights, Taiwanese society has a very
vague legal concept of privacy. The legal history of privacy in Taiwan is relatively short,
and the formulation of privacy is a late addition to the long list of rights. More importantly,
Grand Justices have not yet directly pronounced that the "right to privacy" is a constitu-
tional right prescribed in article 22 of the Constitution. Although privacy is currently em-
bedded in some legal doctrines and there have been a few legal cases defending some aspect
of privacy, the construction of the legal meaning of privacy in Taiwan is far from complete.
In pursuit of privacy, the need for developing a more concrete definition of privacy is a
pressing task.
The overriding issue is the achievement of balance. The Taiwanese law needs to decide
how society should value the need for an individual's privacy, and to develop its own criteria
for balancing the conflicting interests with privacy. The law, as written in the books, has
imported aspects from foreign states, but is now desperate for society to provide a local
definition. Well-constructed criteria should be set to draw the lines between privacy pro-
tection and its competing values.
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